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NOTE
DEFINING 'REASONABLE': THE IMPLICATIONS




Under what circumstances and to what extent can police conduct a
warrantless search of a person's vehicle following a lawful arrest?
Courts have long attempted to balance the protections of the Fourth
Amendment with the interests of law enforcement.' Despite repeated
attempts to establish precedent that protects the rights of individuals
while providing guidance to police officers, courts are still interpreting
this question today.
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in
State v. Mbacke.2 The court upheld a conviction based on evidence
obtained during a warrantless search of the defendant's vehicle.' The
search took place after the defendant was arrested, handcuffed and
confined to the back seat of a patrol car under a charge of carrying a
concealed weapon.' The court distinguished the facts of this case from
those of United States Supreme Court case Arizona v. Gant' and held
that the officers had reason to believe that additional evidence of the
offense of arrest could be found inside the car.6 The Mbacke decision
leaves a great deal of discretion in the hands of police officers, and
fails to clear the muddy waters and define the circumstances that jus-
tify this type of search.
al B.A., North Carolina State University, History, 2006; J.D. Candidate, North Carolina
Central University School of Law, 2014. I'd like to thank Scott and Ryan McKaig for three
decades of front porch debates and Joe Johnson for providing me with a floor to sleep on while
writing this note.
1. See generally Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (opinion begins by outlining the
inconsistency of the precedent, citing a dozen U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with this issue
between 1914 and 1968).
2. State v. Mbacke, - N.C. -, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012).
3. Id.
4. Id. at . 721 S.E.2d at 219.
5. Arizona v. Gant. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
6. Mbacke, - N.C. at , 721 S.E.2d at 222.
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This casenote will examine the rationale of the majority opinion in
Mbacke and the case law that the court relied on in reaching its deci-
sion. This note will also explore the historical evolution of the law
with regard to searches incident to lawful arrest and discuss the effects
of the Mbacke decision on the protection provided under the Fourth
Amendment. The note will explain how the Mbacke decision lessens
the protection North Carolinians enjoy under the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, this note will advocate a change in the law and abandonment
of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
for the benefit of the courts, the police, and the citizens of North
Carolina.
II. THE CASE
Mbacke arises from the arrest of Omar Sidy Mbacke on September
5, 2007.' Officers responded after a 911 caller reported that an armed
man in a yellow shirt was sitting in his driveway in a red Ford Escape.'
The caller also stated that the man had "shot up" his house the previ-
ous night.9 Police arrived as the Ford Escape was pulling out of the
driveway.o Two officers drew their weapons and instructed the driver
to stop the vehicle and put his hands up while a third officer blocked
the driveway with a patrol car." The driver, Mbacke, initially left his
hands on the wheel and then momentarily lowered them toward his
waist, bringing about more forceful demands from the officers.12 After
that brief hesitation, Mbacke put his hands up and exited the vehicle
as instructed and kicked the driver's side door closed." Mbacke laid
on the ground as instructed and was handcuffed.' 4 In response to a
question from one of the officers, Mbacke disclosed that he had a
handgun in his waistband." After retrieving the gun and rendering it
safe, the officers placed Mbacke under arrest for carrying a concealed
weapon and secured him in the back seat of a patrol car.1 6 After se-
curing Mbacke in the back seat of the car, the officers opened the
driver's side door and discovered a white brick wrapped in green
7. State v. Mbacke, N.C. App. - , -, 703 S.E.2d 823, 825 (2011).





13. State v. Mbacke, - N.C. App. , ,703 S.E.2d 823, 825 (2011).
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plastic protruding from under the driver's seat.17 Subsequent tests de-
termined that the brick contained 993.8 grams of cocaine."
Mbacke was indicted for carrying a concealed weapon and traffick-
ing in cocaine by transportation.' 9 The trial court denied a pretrial
motion to suppress all evidence from the stop.20 The motion was re-
newed during the trial with respect to the drug evidence on the same
morning the U.S. Supreme Court issued its ruling in Arizona v.
Gant.2 ' After speaking with the trial judge, Mbacke's council agreed
to continue the trial and pursue the issues raised by Gant via a motion
for appropriate relief after the trial.2 2 Mbacke was convicted on all
counts and sentenced to 175 to 219 months in prison.2 3
On the subsequent motion for appropriate relief, the trial court held
that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Gant was applicable, but
that the search was not a Fourth Amendment violation because the
officers had reason to believe that evidence of the charge of carrying a
concealed weapon, which Mbacke had been arrested for, as well as
evidence relevant to the investigation into the 911 call, would be lo-
cated inside the vehicle. 24 The court included "other firearms, gun
boxes, holsters, ammunition, spent shell casings and other indicia of
ownership of the firearm that was seized" as potential relevant evi-
dence that could have been found inside the car.2 5 The trial court de-
nied the motion for appropriate relief and Mbacke appealed, arguing
that "there was no reason to further investigate the offense of carrying
a concealed weapon with a search of Defendant's vehicle because no
further relevant evidence could be found as the concealed handgun at
issue had already been discovered on Defendant's person." 26
In a 2-to-1 decision, the Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the
motion for appropriate relief, holding that officers did not have rea-
sonable grounds to believe that additional evidence of the carrying of
a concealed weapon would be found in the car.2 7 The dissenting judge
argued that the hypothetical evidence of ownership, intent, and use
were relevant, and that the search was reasonable under the circum-
stances. 28 Finally, the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the de-
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. State v. Mbacke, - N.C.App. , , 703 S.E.2d 823, 824 (2011).
20. Id. at , 703 S.E.2d at 825.
21. State v. Mbacke, N.C. , , 721 S.E.2d 218, 219-20 (2012).
22. Id. at , 721 S.E.2d at 220.
23. Id.
24. Mbacke, - N.C.App. at _ , 703 S.E.2d at 827.
21 Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at , 703 S.E.2d at 830.
28. Id. at , 703 S.E.2d at 831 (Stroud, J., dissenting).
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cision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the denial of the
defendant's motion for appropriate relief, holding that the officers
had reason to believe that additional evidence of the carrying of a
concealed gun would be found inside the car.2 9
III. BACKGROUND
Because this case deals with an exception to the warrant require-
ment, we start with the requirement itself. The Fourth Amendment
provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.o
The Fourth Amendment protects against the types of random searches
and seizures seen in colonial America under general warrants and
writs of assistance.3' -[T]he Amendment's proscription of 'unreasona-
ble searches and seizures' must be read in light of 'the history that
gave rise to the words'-a history of 'abuses so deeply felt by the Colo-
nies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution . ... "32 This
historical context provides insight into the types of intrusions the
Fourth Amendment is intended to prevent.
As a general rule, "'searches conducted outside the judicial process,
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.'" 3 3 A search conducted as
a contemporaneous incident to a lawful custodial arrest is one of the
established exceptions to the warrant requirement. 34 Under the con-
trolling case law, "[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant's arrest only [one] if the arrestee is within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or [two] it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of ar-
rest."3 Mbacke hinges on whether it was reasonable for the arresting
officers to believe that the Ford Escape contained additional evidence
of the crime of carrying a concealed weapon.3 6
29. State v. Mbacke, - N.C. -, , 721 S.E.2d. 218, 223 (2012).
30. U.S. CONsr. amend. IV.
31. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
32. Id. at 760-61 (quoting United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting)).
33. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967)).
34. Id..
35. Id. at 351 (emphasis added).
36. See State v. Mbacke, N.C. _ 721 S.E.2d 218, 219 (2012).
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The majority in Mbacke likened the "reasonable to believe" re-
quirement of Gant to the "reasonable articulable suspicion" test es-
tablished in Terry v. Ohio.7 Decided in June of 1968, Terry
established that police officers are entitled to "conduct a carefully lim-
ited search of the outer clothing" of a person when "a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in
light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently danger-
ous."38 By upholding the constitutionality of a reasonable "stop and
frisk" search, Terry allows for the limited search and seizure of a per-
son who is not under arrest, absent a warrant or probable cause.3 ' The
Court notes, however, that even a simple pat down "is a serious intru-
sion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity
and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken
lightly."40 This exception to the warrant requirement attempts to bal-
ance the Fourth Amendment rights of the individual against the public
policy interests of effective law enforcement and public safety.4 1 To
determine whether a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment, Terry establishes a two-pronged test: "whether the officer's ac-
tion was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference
in the first place."4 2 This rationale was extended in later cases to jus-
tify and define the scope of searches performed contemporaneously
with a lawful arrest. 4 3
The U.S. Supreme Court applied the officer safety rationale in an
attempt to solidify the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest
in 1969 with Chimel v. California.4 4 The Court ruled that there is "no
constitutional justification, in the absence of a search warrant," for
police to search the home of a lawfully arrested defendant "beyond
37. Id. at _, 721 S.E.2d at 222.
38. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (holding that a brief seizure and pat down of sus-
pect, without probable cause, when officer has observed behavior leading him to believe that
suspect is arimed and presents a danger to the officer or to the public at large, is not unreasona-
ble under the Fourth Amendment).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 17.
41. See id. at 24 ("When an officer is justified in believing that the individual whose suspi-
cious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and presently dangerous to the officer
or to others. it would appear to be clearly unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take
necessary measures to determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutral-
ize the threat of physical harm.").
42. Id. at 19-20.
43. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
44. See Chimel, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (holding that a search performed as a contemporaneous
incident to a lawful arrest should be limited to the person of the arrestee and the area from
within which he might be able to retrieve a weapon or evidence that could be used against him).
2012] 99
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the [arrestee's] person and the area from within which he might have
obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as
evidence against him." 5 Quoting Terry, the Court held that "'(t)he
scope of (a) search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the cir-
cumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.' " As in Terry,
the Court looked at both the justification for the search itself and the
permissible scope of such a search in holding:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to
search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the
latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape.
Otherwise, the officer s safety might well be endangered, and the ar-
rest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the ar-
resting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's
person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the
area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.47
Under Chimel, the police are required to obtain a warrant to search
beyond the reach of the arrestee unless there is some "grave emer-
gency" which makes such a search immediately necessary.4 8
In 1981, the Court addressed the search of an automobile following
the arrest of the passengers for marijuana possession in New York v.
Belton.49 The Court held that "when a policeman has made a lawful
custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a con-
temporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compart-
ment of that automobile" and any containers found therein.5o The
Court justified this by reasoning that items inside the passenger com-
partment "are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within 'the area
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evi-
dentiary ite[m].'"' The arresting officer in the Belton case found co-
caine in the zippered pocket of the defendant's jacket which was lying
on the back seat of a car in which the defendant was a passenger. 2
The four occupants of the car were under arrest at the time of the
search but were not handcuffed or restrained." The court purported
to adhere to the officer safety rationale as a justification for the search
45. Id. at 768.
46. Id. at 762 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
47. Id. at 762-63.
48. See id. at 761 ("Absent some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a
magistrate between the citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals nor to make
the home a safe haven for illegal activities. It was done so that an objective mind might weigh the
need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the law.").
49. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
50. Id. at 460.
51. Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763).
52. Id. at 4S6.
53. Id.
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itself, but noted the difficulty of defining Chimel's "area within the
immediate control of the arrestee" and sought to establish a bright
line test to clearly establish the rights of citizens and officers.54 "When
a person cannot know how a court will apply a settled principle to a
recurring factual situation, that person cannot know the scope of his
constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the scope of his
authority.""" Taking the arrestee's wingspan out of the equation and
defining the entire passenger compartment as within the control of the
arrestee would provide a clear rule which is easy for both officers and
the public at large to understand. Accordingly, this decision has been
interpreted by many courts, law enforcement agencies, and five cur-
rent justices of the U.S. Supreme Court to establish that police are
always entitled to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle inci-
dent to the lawful arrest of an occupant.56 Police officers, including the
Winston-Salem police officers in Mbacke, have conducted such
searches as standard procedure in reliance on Belton for more than
twenty years. 7 This interpretation of Belton succeeds in establishing
clarity but allows warrantless searches in situations where the officer
safety and evidence preservation rationales underlying Terry and
Chinel are absent.5 8
This presumed entitlement was expanded in 2004 by Thornton v.
United States in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the search of
a vehicle was justified even when the officer's first contact with the
suspect occurred after the suspect had exited the vehicle, extending
Belton to cover recent occupants.5 1 Justice Scalia disagreed with the
rationale of the majority in Thornton, noting that the officer safety
and evidence preservation rationales underlying Chimel are virtually
never present in Belton searches because modern police procedure is
to handcuff and secure the defendant before conducting the search.6 0
He advocated abandoning the officer safety and evidence preserva-
tion rationale of Chimel and allowing vehicle searches only when
54. See id. at 458-60.
55. Id. at 459-60.
56. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 357 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
57. See State v. Mbacke,_ N.C. App. -, 703 S.E.2d 823 (2011) (standard Winston Salem
PD procedure to search defendant's car after arrest relying on Belton); Gant, 556 U.S. at 359
(Alito, J., dissenting) ("The Belton rule has been taught to police officers for more than a quar-
ter century. Many searches-almost certainly including more than a few that figure in cases now
on appeal-were conducted in scrupulous reliance on that precedent").
58. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (-To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every
recent occupant's arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the
Chimel exception").
59. Thornton v. U.S , 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
60. Id. at 625-27 (Scalia, J., concurring).
1012012]
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there is reason to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest will be
found within the vehicle.6 1
The case on which Mbacke's motion for appropriate relief was
based was the U.S. Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Gant.1 In Gant,
the Court criticized the broad interpretation of Belton and Thornton
and held that the search of a vehicle after the driver's arrest for driv-
ing while under a license revocation was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.63 It sets out a two prong test to establish the limits of
these vehicle searches, specifically:
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only
if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compart-
ment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle
contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these justifications
are absent, a search of an arrestee's vehicle will be unreasonable un-
less police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the war-
rant requirement applies. 64
The first prong of the test established by Gant mirrors the officer
safety and evidence preservation rationale of Chimel.65 For the second
prong of the test, the Court carved out a new exception based on Jus-
tice Scalia's concurring opinion in Thornton.6 6 This second prong al-
lows searches of vehicles, absent probable cause, after the defendant
has been handcuffed and secured when the search can no longer be
justified under the officer safety or evidence preservation justifica-
tions relied on in Chimel. The Court noted that the Belton and Thorn-
ton cases themselves satisfied this new test.67 The suspects in Belton,
while under arrest, had not been handcuffed or otherwise restrained
at the time of the search and could have reached or lunged for a
weapon inside the vehicle; under these circumstances the Belton case
meets the first prong of the Gant test.68 The court notes that in both
Belton and Thornton it was reasonable for the officers to believe that
evidence of the crime of arrest (drug possession) would be found in-
side the vehicles, satisfying the second prong of the test. 9
A parade of cases followed the Gant decision challenging the con-
stitutionality of vehicle searches in which the defendants were secured
in patrol cars and argued that the officers had no reasonable basis to
suspect that their vehicle would contain evidence of the crime of ar-
61. Id. at 629 (Scalia, J., concurring).
62. State v. Mbacke, - N.C. , , 721 S.E.2d 218, 220 (2012).
63. Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
64. Id. at 351.
65. Id. at 339.
66. Id. at 343 (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
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rest. 0 As noted by the majority in Mbacke, most of these cases have
held that an arrest for a weapons offense gives rise to a reasonable
suspicion that additional evidence of the crime of arrest will be found
during a vehicle search. Other courts confronted with similar facts,
including the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Mbacke, have held
that possession of a concealed weapon does not give rise to a reason
to believe that additional evidence of the crime of arrest will be found
in the defendant's vehicle. 2
The most recent development in this area is the U.S. Supreme
Court's 2011 ruling in United States v. Davis.73 Justice Alito's majority
opinion confirms that Gant applies retroactively to cases that were not
yet finalized at the time of the decision, but also creates a good faith
exception which limits the availability of the exclusionary rule as a
remedy to an unconstitutional search. 74 "Evidence obtained during a
search conducted in reasonable reliance on binding precedent is not
subject to the exclusionary rule."" Critics argue that this leaves de-
fendants with no remedy in cases where their constitutional rights
were violated and as a result, will stunt the development of Fourth
Amendment law by discouraging defendants from seeking appellate
review.76
IV. ANALYSIS
In deciding Mbacke, the North Carolina Supreme Court set out to
define the "reasonable to believe" standard required under part two
of the Gant test.7  The court held that "reasonable to believe" is a
lower standard than that of probable cause and reasoned that "the
underlying concept of a reasonable articulable suspicion discussed in
Terry, is readily adaptable to a scenario in which a search of a vehicle
is contemplated after the occupants have been arrested and de-
tained."7 In doing so, the majority used Terry, which authorized a
limited pat down of the outside of a person's clothing as part of an
70. State v. Mbacke, - N.C. _, 721 S.E.2d 218, 222-23 (citing U.S. v. Rochelle, 422
F. App'x. 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2011); U.S. v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2010); U.S. v.
Leak, No. 3:09-cr-81 -W, 2010 WL 1418227, at *5 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 5, 2010); U.S. v. Wade, No.
09-462, 2010 WL 1254263, at *2-3, *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2010); People v. Osborne, 96
Cal.Rptr.3d 696, 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); U.S. v. Brunick, 374 F. App'x. 714, 716 (9th Cir. 2010)
(unpublished)).
71. Mbacke, - N.C. at , 721 S.E.2d at 222-23.
72. State v. Mbacke, N.C. App. -, 703 S.E.2d 823 (2011).
73. Davis v. U. S., 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011).
74. Id. at 2431.
75. Id. at 2429.
76. Id. at 2437-38 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
77. State v. Mbacke, - N.C. , , 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (2012).
78. Id. (internal citations omitted).
2012] 103
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investigation,7 9 to justify a much more thorough search of the passen-
ger area of an automobile and any containers found therein after the
arrestee had been secured and the officer or public safety concerns
underlying Terry were no longer present.so The court also cited United
States v. Place to establish that "reason to believe" equates to a lower
standard than that of probable cause.
The dissent in Mbacke noted the glaring difference in the scope of
the search authorized under Place and the one conducted by the Win-
ston Salem police in this case and disagreed with its application to a
search incident to arrest.82 Like Terry, Place authorized a very specific
limited seizure for a less invasive, investigative search rather than the
much broader Belton search. The court purports to render a decision
consistent with the aims of Terry, Chimel, and Gant while failing to
heed the mandate established by Terry and later quoted in Chimel :
"[t]he scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.""
Even the carefully limited scope of a Terry stop has been criticized
for weakening Fourth Amendment protections by granting the police
authority to search in situations where a judge would not have the
authority to authorize one. 5 "To give police greater power than a
magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path."" The
Mbacke Court's interpretation of "reasonable" authorizes searches
without warrants or probable cause and it does so without the justifi-
cations offered by Terry."
Even with a standard lower than that of probable cause, the search
in Mbacke pushes the limits of reason. Each piece of evidence the
state hypothesized could be found within the car was either altogether
irrelevant or was evidence of a separate offense." Gun boxes, receipts
and other evidence of ownership would lend no support to the con-
cealed weapon charge because ownership of the gun is not an element
of the offense. 9 Spent shell casings, while relevant to an investigation
79. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.], 21-22 (1968).
80. Mbacke, - N.C. at _, 721 S.E.2d at 224 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at , 721 S.E.2d at 222 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at ,721 S.E.2d at 225 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (noting that the search
authorized by Place was limited to a brief detention of luggage to allow trained drug dogs to sniff
the unopened bags for contraband).
83. U. S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
84. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19).
85. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 35-39 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (advocating strict adherence
to the requirement for probable cause unless and until a constitutional amendment adjusts the
probable cause requirement).
86. Id. at 38
87. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
88. State v. Mbacke, - N.C. App. _, _ 703 S.E.2d 823, 830 (2011).
89. Id.
10
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into the alleged shooting the night before the arrest, would lend no
support to the charge of carrying a concealed weapon when the
weapon in question has already been surrendered to and secured by
law enforcement.90
The majority decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court cited a
half dozen decisions from other jurisdictions finding it reasonable for
an officer to believe that a vehicle could contain evidence of the crime
of carrying a concealed weapon after the weapon in question had been
secured by police.9' After stating that weapons charges will almost
always give rise to a reasonable belief,92 the opinion notes:
We stress that we are not holding that an arrest for carrying a con-
cealed weapon is ipso facto an occasion that justifies the search of a
vehicle. We believe that the "reasonable to believe" standard required
by Gant will not routinely be based on the nature or type of the of-
fense of arrest and that the circumstances of each case ordinarily will
determine the propriety of any vehicular searches conducted incident
to an arrest.
This case-by-case approach leaves great uncertainty as to when and to
what extent these searches are justified. As the majority noted in Bel-
ton, "[a] single familiar standard is essential to guide police officers,
who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and balance the
social and individual interests involved in the specific circumstances
they confront." 94 While the Court's choice in Belton, to promote con-
sistency by limiting a constitutional protection, was regrettable,
there are advantages to adopting a clear and simple standard which is
easily understood by the police and the public at large.
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands,
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline dis-
tinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds
of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be 'literally impossi-
ble of application by the officer in the field."96
The court notes that "[oither circumstances. . . such as the report of
defendant's actions the night before and defendant's furtive behavior
when confronted by officers, support a finding that it was reasonable
to believe additional evidence of the offense of arrest would be found
in defendant's vehicle."97 Allowing a warrantless vehicle search based
90. Id.
91. See State v. Mbacke, - N.C. , 721 S.E.2d 218, 222-23.
92. State v. Mbacke, N.C. , , 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (2012).
93. Id. at , S.E.2d at 223.
94. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S., 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 213-14 (1979)).
95. Id. at 466 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 458 (majority opinion) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, Case-By-Case Adjudication
Versus Standardized Procedures: The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup.Ct.Rev. 127, 142 (1974)).
97. Mbacke, N.C. at , 721 S.E.2d at 222.
2012] 105
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on a report of a totally separate offense and unspecified "furtive" be-
havior provides shockingly little in the way of guidance for officers in
the field. The dissent further states that if the act of closing the car
door upon exiting constitutes "furtive behavior" sufficient to justify
reasonable suspicion, the majority opinion "dangerously undermines
the right to privacy" by penalizing drivers for attempting to protect
their Fourth Amendment rights."
Despite the numerous problems with the Mbacke decision, the
holding of the majority is not unreasonable or inconsistent with prece-
dent. Justices Scalia, Alito, Breyer, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rob-
erts all felt that the decision in Gant amounted to a reversal rather
than a clarification of Belton and Thornton.99 Justice Scalia concurred
in the judgment only to avoid 4-to-1-to-4 decision, which would have
left Belton and Thornton unchecked.' 00 By expressing the decision in
Gant as a clarification of Belton and Thornton and allowing searches
after the defendant has been arrested and secured, the Court leaves
the door open for police departments and lower courts to continue
operating essentially as they have under Belton as long as they can
think of some hypothetical piece of evidence that could be used to
support the charge. Police officers are given a fishing license which
allows them to rummage through vehicles for evidence of any crime as
long as they can think of some theoretical piece of evidence that could
be found to support the crime of arrest. In his opinion concurring in
result with Gant, Justice Scalia expressed his opinion that many of the
searches allowed under Belton were unconstitutional, but agreed with
the majority that officers should be allowed to search when they have
reason to believe that evidence of the crime of arrest will be found
within the vehicle.' He disagreed with the "within reaching distance"
portion of the test established by Gant and advocated abandoning the
"charade of officer safety," arguing that the continued use of this ra-
tionale encourages officers to leave suspects unsecured in the interests
of conducting a more expansive search.'0 2 "[P]olice virtually always
have a less intrusive and more effective means of ensuring their
safety-and a means that is virtually always employed: ordering the
arrestee away from the vehicle, patting him down in the open, hand-
98. Id. at 224 (Timmons-Goodson, J.. dissenting) ("On the one hand, if defendant closes the
vehicle door when complying with an officer's order to exit the vehicle, then law enforcement,
under today's opinion, can search the car. On the other hand, if defendant leaves the door open,
officers can conduct a broader plain view search of the passenger compartment.").
99. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring); Id. at 354 (Breyer,
J., dissenting); Id. at 355(Alito, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 354 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 353 (Scalia J., concurring).
102. Id. at 352-53.
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cuffing him, and placing him in the squad car."" 3 Under Justice
Scalia's reasoning, police officers cannot be trusted not to place them-
selves in danger in order to justify a more intensive search, but they
can be trusted to make a legal determination as to whether or not
there is reason to believe evidence of the crime of arrest will be found
during a vehicle search. Justice Scalia did not offer a justification for
upholding a vehicle search on a standard lower than probable cause
absent the officer safety justification.
There are other exceptions to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment which can justify a vehicle search without a war-
rant. Consent, plain view, exigent circumstances, the automobile ex-
ception, and even an inventory search, can provide justification for the
search of an automobile without a warrant'O4 . However, these excep-
tions each require the existence of circumstances which make the war-
rantless search reasonable and result in fewer instances of the
pretextual and unconstitutional searches allowed under Belton,
Thornton and Gant.
"To provide the necessary security against unreasonable intrusions
upon the private lives of individuals, the framers of the Fourth
Amendment required adherence to judicial process wherever possi-
ble."' "We cannot be true to that constitutional requirement and ex-
cuse the absence of a search warrant without a showing by those who
seek exemption from the constitutional mandate that the exigencies of
the situation made that course imperative."l 0 6 In deciding Terry, the
U.S. Supreme Court was careful to note "we do not retreat from our
holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure." 0 7
The officers who conducted the search of Mbacke had ample oppor-
tunity to obtain a warrant yet conducted a warrantless search justified
only by the pretense that the officers were looking for evidence of a
crime for which they had already collected and secured all relevant
evidence. 0 Allowing these types of warrantless searches of a vehicle,
after its occupants have been removed and confined, based on any
standard lower than that of probable cause, allows officers more dis-
cretion than judges in determining when a search is appropriate and
103. Id. at 351-52.
104. See Davis v. U.S., 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (consent); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443 (1971) (plain view); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (safety of officers and the pub-
lic); Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (automobile exception); South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory).
105. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758-59 (1969).
106. Id. at 761 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948)).
107. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
108. See State v. Mbacke, - N.C. App. , , 703 S.E.2d 823, 830-31 (2011).
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inevitably yields unconstitutional results. The Mbacke decision weak-
ens Fourth Amendment protections by granting officers a broader
power to search than the Constitution allows. This is especially fright-
ening in the light of Davis v. United States under which Defendants
who are convicted based on evidence obtained in unconstitutional
searches may have no available remedy if the unconstitutional search
was conducted in good faith reliance on precedent.'09
In limiting Belton and Thornton, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted
to reduce the incidents of unconstitutional searches, but by using rea-
sonable belief rather than probable cause as the test to justify a vehi-
cle search, the Court left the door open for state courts to justify bad
searches on a case-by-case basis. Mbacke is a prime example of just
such a result. A search incident to a lawful arrest "is an exception
justified by necessity to a rule that would otherwise render the
search unlawful."' 1 o Other exceptions to the warrant requirement pro-
vide the police with the necessary power to investigate and respond to
emergency situations without giving them license to go fishing through
people's possessions looking for evidence of other crimes. This line of
cases, beginning with Chimel, should be revisited and either the "rea-
sonable to believe" standard should be replaced with that of probable
cause or the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant require-
ment should be abandoned. Requiring probable cause for the search
of a vehicle and abandoning both the officer safety and evidence pres-
ervation reasoning of Chimel and the "reasonable belief" test ex-
pressed in Gant, would establish a clear standard, which would be
easily understood by both police officers and the public. Such a rule
would protect the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens, have little or
no impact on officer safety, and take us a step away from the "totali-
tarian path" that Justice Douglas warned of in his dissent in Terry."'
"Only that line (probable cause) draws a meaningful distinction be-
tween an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the
officer's personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man
that the person seized has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a particular crime."11 2
V. CONCLUSION
Mbacke presented the North Carolina Supreme Court with the op-
portunity to protect citizens from unconstitutional searches performed
109. See Davis v. U. S., 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011).
110. Thornton v. U.S., 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. Terry, 392 U.S. at 38 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("To give police greater power than a
magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path.").
112. Id.
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in reliance on Belton. The court chose instead to sanction a pretextual
search and leave the door open for police officers to continue the
practice of conducting vehicle searches absent a warrant or probable
cause. This grants law enforcement officers a broader authority to
conduct searches than that granted to judges to authorize such
searches and leaves all citizens at the mercy of police, who may inten-
tionally, or as a result of inadequate knowledge, violate their rights.
The immediate effect of the Mbacke decision, keeping Omar
Mbacke in prison, is likely to be the popular choice. It is easy to side
with the police officers over the cocaine dealer and bend the rules to
bring about a desired result, but the legality of a search should not
hinge on the character of the defendant or the evidence obtained. In
limiting the rights of Omar Mbacke, we pay too heavy a price to up-
hold one conviction. The court has made the popular choice at the
expense of the law and has weakened the constitutional protections
that all North Carolinians enjoy.
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